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tions in which, once the point of insolvenc:1 is renched, the deterrent effect of 
stiffer tort penalties does not merely disappear but has the counterintuitive 
effect of encouraging the penali�ed activity. When the liability pertains co a 
possibly defective produce !hat has already been sold, stiffer penalties can 
encourage a manufacturer co continue to produce the product. Because stiffer 
penalties reduce the manufacturer's equity if the product is dangerous and pro­
duction ceases, but has no additional effect on its equity if the product is dan­
gerous and production continues, the manufacturer risks less by continuing 
production when penalties are stiffer. This can lead the manufacturer co con­
tinue production, whereas with less stiff penalties it would cease production. 
INTRODUCTION 
Both proponents and opponents of products liability reform agree that 
larger judgments will discourage companies from introducing and con­
tinuing to market many products and services. They part over the 
desirability of these effects. Defenders of the status quo argue that stiff 
penalties have forced manufacturers to remove unsafe products from the 
market and, better still, have prevented other dangerous products from ever 
being sold. In contrast, reformers argue that stiff penalties have 
discouraged producers from introducing many safe, new products into the 
market. Both positions are premised on the belief that larger judgments 
will discourage the penalized activity. This Article describes an important 
exception to that rule. Specifically, this Article describes a large class of 
cases in which the usual intuition is reversed-stiffer penalties encourage 
companies to produce and sell risky products that they would otherwise 
withdraw from the market were penalties lower. 
That counterintuitive result is driven by the possibility of discharge in 
bankruptcy. Both personal bankruptcy and corporate limited liability 
establish upper bounds on what an individual or corporation can lose if it is 
assessed a large tort judgment.1 Because debts are discharged in bank­
ruptcy, neither an individual nor a corporate tortfeasor can lose more than 
its current net wealth. As a result, the literature has long recognized that 
penalties in excess of a party's net wealth have no additional deterrent 
effect.2 What has not previously been recognized is that such larger penal­
ties might actually encourage the production of riskier products. 
1. Bankruptcy is governed by federal law; state law provides for limited corporate liabil-
ity. Set DouGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 82-87 (1992). 
2. Set A. Mitchdl Polinsky & Steven Shavell, A No� on Opomal Fmts When Wealth 
Varies Among Jndillidual.s, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 618, 618 (1991); Steven Shavell, The Judgment 
Proof Problem, 6 INT'L REV. L. & EcoN. 45, 45 ( 1986). 
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The intuition behind that result is as follows: When faced with a 
decision whether to continue producing a product that might be dangerous, 
a rational decisionmaker will compare its expected wealth if it continues 
production with its expected wealth if it ceases production.' Once penal­
ties are stiff enough that the decisionmaker will be bankrupt if it continues 
production and is held liable, further increasing liability awards will have 
no effect on its expected wealth if production continues. However, if the 
manufacturer would not be bankrupt if it ceased production and is held 
liable, then further increasing liability awards will reduce its expected 
wealth if production ceases. In this range, the cost to the decisionmaker of 
continuing production decreases as liability awards increase. As a result, 
the decisionmaker might continue to produce a potentially dangerous 
product that it would have stopped producing if liability awards were 
smaller. This is the "perverse effect." 
Part I of this Article provides a simple numerical example of the 
perverse effect, in which stiffer penalties encourage the production of 
risi<ier products in a strict liability regime. Part II generalizes that result 
and shows that when there are prior sales, there is always a range over 
which increasing the stiffness of tort penalties has the perverse effect. Part 
Ill discusses the factors that influence the magnitude of the effect and 
argues that the effect is very likely widespread because it can occur even at 
low penalty levels. Part IV extends the basic result to a more complex 
world that uses a negligence standard. Part V discusses avenues for further 
research, including several potential solutions to the perverse effect of high 
liability awards. 
I. A SIMPLE NUMERICAL EXAMPLE OF THE PERVERSE EFFECT 
The perverse effect of stiffer tort penalties in products liability cases 
can be made more concrete through a simple numerical example. Consider 
the decision whether to continue to produce widgets in a strict liability 
regime. Assume that the manufacturer concludes that there is a 1 0% 
chance that widgets are dangerous, in which case previously sold widgets 
will cause $4 million in harm. Also, assume that if the manufacturer con-
3. 
. 
T? simplify the diKussion, I assume that the actors are ruk neutral. Although thu 
assumption IS not necessary to denve the principal results, it subscanually Simplifies the mathe­
matics. I also assume that the decision whether to continue production is made on the basu of 
the manufacturer's expected net equity. That is to say, the manufacturer will continue pro, 
duct ion when its expected equity u higher if it continues; otherwise, it will cease production. 
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tinues production, it will earn a $1 million profit.4 Furthermore, if the 
manufacturer continues to produce and sell widgets, and if the widgets are 
dangerous, an additional $16 million in harm will occur. Assuming that 
the manufacturer is liable for the full amount of the harm caused by its 
widgets and has enough equity so it will not be bankrupt if its widgets are 
dangerous-at least $19 million when it makes the decision-the equity· 
holders will cease production.s 
Alternatively, assume that the manufacturer's equity is only $12 
million when it makes the decision. I f  the manufacturer ceases production, 
and if its widgets are not dangerous, the manufacturer's equity will be $12 
million; but if the widgets are dangerous, the manufacturer's equity will be 
$8 million after paying its liability. Because there is a 90% chance that its 
widgets are not dangerous, the manufacturer's equity has an expected value 
4. I ignore considerations relating to the time value of money because such considcra· 
tions would complicate the exposition. 
5. That the manufacturer will cease production if it has at least $19 million of equity can 
be seen as follows: If the manufacturer ceases production, and if its widgets are not dangerous, the 
equity will be the original $19 million. But, if the widgets are dangerous, the equity will be $15 
million. Because there u a 90% chance that the widgets arc not dangerous, the manufacturer's 
equity has an expected value of$18.6 million-that is, (0.9 x $19 million)+ (0.1 x $15 million). 
If, however, the manufacturer continues production, then its equity w1ll be $20 million if its 
widgets are not dangerous and $0 if they are dangerous. Thus, if it continues production, the 
manufacturer's equity has an expected value of $18 million ((0.9 x $20 million) + (0. 1 x $0)), 
which is $600,000 less than its expected value if production ceases. Thus, the manufacturer will 
cease producing widgets. The result is illustrated in the following table: 
Cease Production Continue Production 
$ mill1ons probabilitY $millions probability 
Not Dangerous 19 0. 9 20 0.9 
Dan2erous 15 0. 1 0 0.1 
Expected Value 18.6 18 
Although the manufacturer might now wish that it had never started production, the deci· 
s1on to begin production might have been rational when made, as illustrated by the following 
example. Assume that when the manufacturer first began to produce widgets, it thought there 
would be a 50% probability that the current situation-a 10% chance that the product is dan· 
gerous-would exist, and a 50% probability that the manufacturer would definitely know that 
the product was safe. Assuming further that, as expected, the manufacturer broke even on sales 
until this point. Thus, if the product had proven to be safe, the manufacturer would have earned 
a $1 million profit. Because there was a 50% chance of this occurring, this possibility had an 
expected value of $50 0,000. This value exceeds the manufacturer's $400,000 expected cost of 
producing widgets if It had not already been proven safe, which had an expected cost of $200,000 
when production first began. Thus, by beginning widget production, the manufacturer increased 
the expected value of its equity by $300,000. 
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of $ 11.6 million.6 If, however, the manufacturer continues production, and 
if its widgets are not dangerous, it will have $13 million of equity; but if 
they are dangerous, it will be bankrupt. Thus, if the manufacturer contin· 
ues production, its equity has an expected value of $ 1 1.7 million/ which is 
$100,000 more than if production ceases. Thus, because the manufacturer 
has a $1 00,000 expected gain by continuing production, it will keep its 
widgets on the market.8 
If the penalty were smaller, however, the manufacturer might make a 
different decision. Assume, for example, that the manufacturer has to pay 
only 70% of any harm caused by its widgets. In that case, the manufacturer 
will have $9.2 million of equity if it ceases production and the product is 
dangerous.9 If its widgets are not dangerous, the manufacturer will still 
have $12 million in equity. Because there is a 90% chance that its widgets 
are not dangerous, the manufacturer's equity, if it ceases production, has an 
expected value of $1 1.72 million.10 If, however, the manufacturer contin· 
ues production, it has a 1 0% chance of losing this equity and a 90% chance 
of having $13 million in equity. This has an expected value of $1 1.7 
million,11 which is $20,000 less than the expected value of the manu· 
facturer's equity from ceasing production. Thus, because the manu· 
6. The expected value of the manufacturer's equity if production ceases is calculated as 
follow.: Expected Value (Ceasing) • (0.9 x $12 million) + (0. 1 x $8 million) • $11. 6 million. 
7. The expected value of the manufacturer's equity if production continues u calculated 
as follows: Expected Value (Continuing) • (0.9 x $13 million)+ (0.1 x $0) = $11.7 million. 
8. The result is illustrated in the following table: 
Cease Production Continue Production 
$millions probabilitv $millions orobab1litv 
Not Danl!erous 12 0 .9 13 0.9 
Danl!erOUS 8 0.1 0 0. 1 
Expected Value 11.6 11. 7  
9. If its widgets arc dangerous, the manufacturer will pay $2. 8 million- 70% of the total 
harm of $4 million. Because the manufacturer has equity of $12 million, it will have $9.2 m1lhon 
after it pays the judgment. 
10. The expected value of the manufacturer's equity if production ceases is calculated as 
follows: Expected Value (Ceasing)= (0. 9 x $12 million)+ (0.1 x $9.2 million)= $11.72 million. 
11. The expected value of the manufacturer's equity if production continues IS calculated 
as follow.: Expected Value (Continuing) • (0.9 x $13 million)+ (0.1 x $0) • $11.7 million. 
Thu u exactly the same as in note 7, supra, because the manufacturer is bankrupt tf producuon 
continues and the product is dangerous, regardless of whether the penalty is I 0 0% or 70% of any 
harm. 
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facturer would have a $20,000 expected loss by continuing it will d1's • 12 • con tinue widget production. 
�e example, therefore, illustrates that increasing the severity of tort 
penalties does not always either increase deterrence or have no effect on 
t�e level of deterren��-the two possibilities recognized in the existing 
literature. Instead, ra1smg the severity of tort penalties from 70% to 100% 
of any
. 
harm
. 
caused reduces deterrence: the manufacturer will continue 
producm� w1dgets when the tort penalty requires full compensation, 
whereas It waul� have stopped producing widgets had the penalty been 
only 70%. Th1s counterintuitive result, whereby stiffer tort penalties 
encourage manufacturers to produce potentially dangerous products that 
they would have otherwise withdrawn from the market, is an example of 
the perverse effect. 
II. STRJcr LJABJLJTY 
This part ge�eralizes the r�sult set forth in the previous example: Whe� there are pnor sales, there 1s always a range within which increasing 
the sttffness of tort penalties produces the perverse effect. This is done in 
seve�! s�eps. First, this part sets out the general problem of a manufacturer 
considenng whether to continue producing a potentially dangerous 
product. Se�ond, �is framework is used to show that if there are no prior 
sales, �en mc�e�mg the severity of tort penalties will discourage the 
productl�n of . nsber products until the point of bankruptcy is reached. 
After 
_
this �mt, t�ere is no additional deterrent effect from raising 
pe.naltles. Third, th1s same framework is used to show that when there are 
�nor sales, the perverse effect will occur over a range as tort penalties 
mcrease. 
To 
_
illustrate the perverse effect, this part presents the problem of a 
corpo�t.
ion manufacturing a product that might be dangerous.u The 
probability that the product is dangerous, p, evolves over time as expe-
12. The r�ult is illustrated in the followmg table: 
Cease Production Continue Production 
$millions orobabilitv $millions probability 
Not Dan�erous 12 0.9 lJ 0.9 
Dan�erous 9.2 0. 1 0 0. 1 
Exoected Value 11.72 11 .7  
odlJ. . I 
d
say "might" because I focus on the time before anyone really knows whether the 
pr uct IS angerous. 
r 
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rience increases and evidence is collected and evaluated. In the face of this 
uncertainty, the manufacturer must decide whether to continue or cease 
producing the product. li 
A. The General Problem 
Consider a manufacturing company that has equity with a net value of 
E.15 If the manufacturer continues to produce, it will earn the profit from 
further production, G. If the product turns out not to be harmful, it will 
keep its original equity plus the profit from further production. If, however, 
the product is harmful, it will produce harm, H:6 and a liability award will 
be assessed against the manufacturer of 9H, in which e is a measure of the 
stiffness of tort penalties. If the liability award is equal to the harm (9 = 1 ), 
compensation is complete. If the liability award is less than the harm (9 < 
1),  compensation is incomplete; and if the liability award is more than the 
harm (e > 1), compensation is more than complete. Thus, the higher e is, 
the stiffer the liability regime becomes. Because the firm's probability of 
being held liable is p, the firm's expected liability, assuming it continues 
production, is p9H. Thus, the firm's expected equity from continuing 
production, C, is given by: 
(1) C = E + G - p9H. 
If the manufacturer decides to discontinue production, it will not earn 
the profit from further sales. Nonetheless, with strict liability, the 
manufacturer will be liable for any harm caused by prior sales. Thus, if the 
product is dangerous and production ceases, there is less harm than if 
production continues because the firm does not sell the additional units. 
14. In order to simplify the mathematics, I assume throughout this Article that there is 
only one date at which production can be stopped and that production, once discontinued, can 
never be restarted. 
15. The value of the equity, E, is calculated be{CYTe subtracting any liabilities due to the 
inherent dangerousness of the product, but afrc subtracting any other liabilities the firm might 
have. This simplification does not precisely follow the law, wh1ch, in bankruptcy, treats tort 
creditors on par with unsecured creditors. See BAIRD, supra note I, at 79-87 (describing the 
treatment of lawsuits and subsequent judgments arising in bankruptcy law); David W. Leebron, 
Lirm�d UabilitJ, TCYrt Yicrinu, and Credirors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 156 5, 1637 (1991) (stating that 
"(t]he holders of unsecured debt share pro rata with tort victims"). Adjusting the model to treat 
tort creditors on par with unsecured creditors would not change the principal results. However, 
11 would substantially complicate the mathematics, thereby obscuring the intuition. 
16. To simplify the discussion, I make the unrealistic assumption that G is independent of 
whether the product is acrually harmful. The model could be adjusted to account for a lower 
value of G when the product IS harmful by mcreasmg H to reflect the reduction in G. 
106 45 UCLA LAW REVIEW 99 (199 7) 
Considering this smaller harm, H0, the firm's expected net equity from 
discontinuing production, D ,  is given by: 
{2) D = E - p9H0 • 
Accordingly, the decision whether to continue production will depend 
upon whether C (equation 1) is larger than D (equation 2). If C is greater 
than D, the manufacturer will continue production; otherwise, it will stop. 
Thus, the expected profit from continuing production, X (the difference 
between equations l and 2), is given by: 
{3) X = C - D = G - p9(H - H0) • 
The profit-maximizing decision is to continue production if X is 
positive, otherwise to discontinue it. Accordingly, the firm will continue 
production if the gain from additional sales, G ,  exceeds the expected 
liability, p9(H - H0); otherwise, it will stop. 
Equation 3 ,  however, ignores the impact of limited liability on the 
decision whether to continue production. The manufacturer's expected 
gain from continuing to produce (equation 3)  changes in the presence of 
limited liability because its components (equations 1 and 2) change. With 
limited liability, the manufacturer will pay the lesser of the judgment 
against it or its total equity. Thus, if the manufacturer continues pro­
duction and the product is dangerous, it will pay the lesser of its assessed 
liability, 9H, and the sum of its equity when it chose to continue, E, and its 
profits from continuation, G.17 Thus, the expected equity from con­
tinuing is: 
(4) C = E + G - pmin(E + G, 9H) . 
Similarly, if the manufacturer discontinues production and the 
product is harmful, the manufacturer will pay the successful tort claimants 
the lesser of their claim, 9H0, and its equity, E. Thus, the manufacturer's 
expected equity from discontinuing production is given by: 
(5) D = E - pmin(E, 9I-io) . 
17. Thus, thto Articlto assumc:s that thto firm can inttontionally toxtemalazto at ltoast somto risk. 
If 11 cannot, b<OcaUS<O consumtors arto as knowledgtoablto of thto risks as arto thto firm's tomploytotos, thto 
modd would not apply. 
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It therefore follows that with limited liability, the expected gain to 
equityholders from continuing production (the difference between equa­
tions 4 and 5) can be written as follows: 
(6) X = C - D = (1 - p)G - p[min(E, 9H - G) 
- min(E, Of:-\)] . 
Once again, the profit-maximizing decision is to continue production 
if X is positive and to cease production if X is negative. 
B. No Perverse Effect 
Before examining the situation in which the perverse effect occurs, 
consider the situation in which it does not occur. When there are no prior 
sales {H0= 0), the traditional view of stiffer penalties is accurate: increasing 
tort penalties discourages the production of less risky products until the 
defendant's wealth would be exhausted!5 Once this point is reached, stiffer 
penalties have no additional deterrent effect. 
That result is established as follows: If there are no previous sales, the 
firm's equity if it ceases production, D (equation 5), is equal to E, which is 
independent of e. Thus, the expected gain from production {equation 6) 
becomes: 
(7) X = (l - p)G - pmin(E, 9H - G). 
In examining equation 7, there are two cases to consider depending 
upon the value of e. These two cases are ordered by increasing values of e. 
1. Two Cases 
Case I: The firm is never bankrupt:19 E > 9 H - G. 
For small values of 9 (9 < (E +G)/ H), the firm will not be bankrupt 
if the product is dangerous. When the firm can pay the full liability if the 
product is dangerous, equation 7 becomes: 
(8) X = G - p9H . 
18. Thto idtoa is that hightor tort penaltic:s eliminatto thto riskitost products that would have 
b<Oen productod tf penalties were lower. 
19. When the fair market value of the firm's debts exceeds the fair market value of i!S 
assets, the firm ts bankrupt. Ste BAIRD, suJlra notto I, at 66 n. 73. 
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The assumption that the liability will not bankrupt the firm does not 
imply that the firm will produce the product. Whether the firm begins 
production depends upon the sign of equation 8: if equation 8 is positive, 
the firm will begin production; if it is negative, the firm will not. Because 
equation 8 is a decreasing function of e, there is a single critical value of p, 
call it p', that is the highest value of p for which production will occur. 
That is to say, production will occur for all values of p below p', but for no 
values above p'. Thus, the effectiveness of a liability system can be 
measured by p'. Asp' decreases, more potentially dangerous products are 
deterred. Setting equation 8 equal to 0 and solving for the critical value of 
p, yields: 
(9) p'(6) = G 
eH 
where e in parentheses indicates that the critical probability is a function 
of e. 
Because the denominator in equation 9 is a multiple of e, the critical 
value of p is a decreasing function of 0: as e increases, p' falls. For very low 
values of e, p' is greater than l. Because probabilities cannot be larger than 
1 ,  for very low values of e, the firm will begin production even if it is 
certain that the product is dangerous. However, as e increases, p' will fall 
below I, and it will continue to fall as 0 increases. For values of 0, such 
that p' is less than 1 ,  higher penalties cause the firm not to produce less 
risky products that the firm would have produced with lower penalties. 
Thus, in Case I, higher penalties encourage the manufacturer to withdraw 
less dangerous products from the market. 20 
Case F: The firm is bankrupt if it continues production and the 
product is dangerous: E < OH- G. 
For larger values of e (e > (E + G) I H), the firm will be bankrupt if 
production occurs and the product is dangerous. Thus, for larger values of 
0 (OH- G >E), equation 7 becomes: 
( 10) X = ( l  - p)G - pE . 
Equation 10 is independent of e, indicating that the expected value of 
producing the product does not depend upon the stiffness of the tort 
penalties, but only upon p, G, and E. The product will be produced if 
equation 10 is positive; otherwise, it will not be produced. 
20. Once agam, the idea is that the most dangerous products, which would have been on 
the market were penalties smaller, will not be produced. 
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The critical value of p that separates accepted and rejected projects 
can be derived by setting equation 10 equal to 0, and solving for the 
resulting value of p. Thus, the corresponding critical value of p, again 
denoted p', is given by: 
(11 )  
G 
p' = 
E + G 
Production will occur for values of p below p'; it will not occur for values 
above p'. 
2. The Path 
Neither Case I nor Case F fully describes what happens as tort 
penalties increase; the full picture comes from combining the two cases. 
For low values of e, the manufacturer is in Case I; for high values it is in 
Case F. Thus, when there are no prior sales, the path of the critical 
probability, p', as a function of e, is as illustrated in Figure 1 :  
I ••. • 
Critical 
Probab1l1ty, p' 
E+G 
H 
F 
Severity of Penalties, 9 
FIGURE 1 :  THE TRADITIONAL VIEW OF STIFFER TO R T PENALTIES 
Figure 1 describes the traditional view of the deterrent effect of 
increasing tort penalties.21 As tort penalties increase, less risky products are 
21. That the path m Figure I is continuous can be established as follows: The border 
between Cases I and F occurs when a • (E +G) I H. The critical probability at the end of Case I 
is given by subsmuting that value for a into equation 9, the equation for the Crttlcal probability 
in Case I: 
,E+ G G G p ( --} =- = --. H 9H E + G 
Because the critical probability at the end of Case I equals the critical probability through· 
out Case F (G / (E +G)), the path is continuous. 
110 45 UCLA LAW REVIEW99 ( 199 7) 
removed from the market. Once the defendant's wealth would be 
exhausted if the product were dangerous, then further increasing penalties 
has no additional deterrent effect. 
C. The Perverse Effect 
This section shows that the perverse effect occurs when the 
manufacturer has made prior sales. When there are prior sales, there is a 
range over which stiffer tort penalties will encourage the manufacturer to 
continue to produce riskier products that it would have withdrawn with 
less stiff penalties. 
The previous section examined the special case in which there were 
no prior sales of the product (H0 = 0). In this section, I return to the 
general case in which H0 is positive. In examining equation 6, the general 
equati?n for the expected gain from continuing to produce a possibly 
defective product for a manufacturer with limited liability, there are four 
cases to consider depending upon the value of e. These cases are ordered 
roughly by increasing values of e. 
1. Four Cases 
Case I: The firm is never bankrupt: E > eH - G, eH0• 
For small values of e, the firm will never be bankrupt. When the firm 
can pay the liability in full if the product is dangerous, regardless of its 
decision to continue or cease production, the expected gain from con­
tinuing production is unchanged by the introduction of limited liability. 
Thus, equation 6 reduces to equation 3-the equation without limited 
liability. 
Setting the net gain in equation 3 equal to 0, and solving for the 
critical value of p, yields: 
(12) G p'(e) = 
e(H H0) 
As before, P' is a decreasing function of e. For very low values of e, the 
firm will always continue production because probabilities are bounded above 
by 1. As e increases beyond this range, stiffer penalties will reduce the 
c
.
ritic�l value of p. Thus, in Case I, the standard view holds: higher penal­
ties dtscourage production of less risky products. 
If e is large enough such that the firm will be forced into bankruptcy if 
the product is harmful, the firm's expected gain from continuing pro-
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duction cannot be reduced to equation 3. Obviously, when e is very large, 
the firm will be bankrupt if the product is dangerous, regardless of whether 
it continues or ceases production. This is Case IV.n However, for inter­
mediate values of e. assuming the product is dangerous, the firm will be 
bankrupt either if production continues but not if it ceases, or alternatively, 
if production ceases but not if it continues. As e increases, the question 
whether the firm first becomes bankrupt when it continues or ceases 
production distinguishes Case II and Case III. 
Case II: The firm is bankrupt if and only if the product is dangerous 
and production continues: eH- G > E > eH0• 
The second possibility is that if the product is dangerous, the firm can 
pay the full award if it ceases production, but not if it continues 
production. The assumption that the entire liability award can be paid if 
the product is dangerous and production ceases implies that E > eHO. The 
assumption that the firm will be bankrupt if the product is dangerous and 
production continues implies that E < eH- G. Therefore, the expected 
gain from continuing production (equation 6) can be written as: 
(13) X = C - D = (1 - p)G - p(E - eH0). 
For values of e such that the firm is in Case II, the expected gain from 
continuing production (equation 13) is a decreasing function of p. Thus, 
there is once again a single value of p that represents the highest value for 
which production will continue. Setting equation 13 equal to 0 and 
solving for the critical value of p, yields: 
(14) p'(e) = G 
G + E - eHo 
Because G and E in equation 14 are independent of e. whereas eHO is 
an increasing function of e. p' is an increasing function of e, indicating 
that as penalties become stiffer, production will continue for riskier 
products. Thus, the perverse effect occurs in Case II: stiffer penalties 
encourage manufacturers to keep producing riskier products that they 
would have withdrawn from production if penalties were lower. The 
intuition behind this result will be discussed after describing the remaining 
cases and the different possible paths for p' as a function of e. 
Case 111: The firm is bankrupt if and only if the product is dangerous 
and production ceases: 8H- G < E < 8H0• 
22. See infra p. liZ. 
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The third possibility is that if the product is dangerous, the firm can 
pay the full judgment if it ceases production {E > 9H0), but not if it 
continues production (9H - G < E). Under these circumstances, the 
expected gain &om continuing production {equation 6) can be written as: 
{15) X = C - 0 = G - p{9H - E) . 
If the firm is in Case III, equation 15 is positive, even for p = l.u The 
intuition is that the equity is larger if production continues {whether or not 
the product is dangerous) than if it stops. Therefore, if the firm finds itself 
in Case III, it will continue production, even if the product is known with 
certainty to be dangerous. Thus, 24 
{16) p' = 1 . 
Case IV: The firm is bankrupt if the product is dangerous: E < 
9H -G, 9H0_. 
The fourth and final possibility is that the firm will be bankrupt if the 
product is dangerous. In this case, E is less than both 9H0 and 9H - G. 
Under this assumption, the expected gain from continuing production 
{equation 6) becomes: 
{17) X = C - 0 = {1 - p)G . 
Equation 17 is positive for values of p less than 1. Thus, once 
penalties are so stiff that the firm will be bankrupt if the product is 
dangerous, regardless of whether it continues or discontinues production, 
the firm will always continue, unless it knows with certainty that the 
product is dangerous. Thus, 
{18) p' = 1 . 
The intuition is that when bankruptcy is inevitable if the product is 
dangerous, then the firm's owners risk nothing by continuing production, 
but they will receive the gain &om further production if the product is not 
23. 11us follows from the assumption that 9H - G < E. Rearrangmg terms, this assump­
tion imphes that G > 9H-E, which in tum implies that G- p(9H- E) > 0 for p S I. 
24. The equauon for the critical value of p is derived by sening equation 15 equal to zero 
and solvmg for p': 
p' (0) • G 
9H - E 
This equation is always greater than I for manufacturers in Case III because in Case lll, 9H - G 
< E, which implies that G > 9H- E. 
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dangerous. Therefore, if there is any chance that the product is safe, they 
will continue production. zs 
To summarize the above results, the expected gain from continuing 
production and the critical value of p for each case are set out in the 
following table. 
Case Expected Gain from Critical Probability, 
Continuing Production, X = p'= 
G 
I G - p9(H - Ho) 9(H - Ho) 
II (1 - p)G - p(E - 9Ha) 
G 
G + E- 9Ha 
III G - p(9H - E) 1 
IV (1 - p)G 1 
2. The Two Paths 
The preceding section derived the expected gain from continuing 
production and the maximum value of p for which production will 
continue for each of the four cases. That section also described within 
each case how the value of 9 affects the critical value of p. To get a 
complete understanding of how 9 affects the critical value of p, it is nec­
essary to take into account that changing the value of 9 can change the 
case. Thus, this section considers how the cases can be combined to 
generate paths that distinguish between those products for which pro­
duction continues and those for which production ceases as tort penalties 
become stiffer. 
Case I applies to very low values of 9, and Case IV applies to very high 
values. Either Case II or Case III, but not both,26 applies to intermediate 
values. Thus, there are two alternative paths for the critical value of p as 
25. The above result does not depend on the relative values for L, G, and p; that is, pro· 
duction will continue regardless of their values. 
26. Both Case II and Case Ill cannot apply to the same flrm for the same nsk because as 9 
increases, the flrm will be bankrupt first either if it continues or 1f it ceases production. If the 
firm simultaneously becomes bankrupt in both states, which only occurs if (E +G) I H = E I H0, 
then Case IV immediately follows Case I. 
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the value of a increases. The first path will contain Cases I, II, and IV; the 
second path will contain Cases I, III, and IV. 
If the former applies, then the path for the critical value of p is as 
illustrated in Figure 2: 
Critical I I· · · -� Probability,p' !IJ 
O' • E + G  £ H H. 
Severity of Penalties, e 
IV 
FIGURE 2: THE PERVERSE EFFECT 
The region above the bold line in Figure 2 represents the products 
that are discontinued; below the line are products that continue to be 
produced.27 The dotted line indicates that production will continue over 
the indicated range, even if the manufacturer knows with certainty that the 
product is dangerous (p = 1 ). The path depicted in Figure 2 first decreases 
and then increases as a increases.28 Obviously, the liability regime has the 
27. Figure 2 assumes that all the other parameters, E, G, H, and H., are given, and it illus­
trates how changing the severity of the penalty, 9, changes the critical probability, p'. 
28. The path as depicted in Figure 2 is continuous because the critical probability at the 
end of Case I equals the critical probabtlity at the beginning of Case II, and the critical probabil­
ity at the end of Case II equals the critical probability at the beginntng of Case IV. 
To establish the ftrst claim, the critical probabtltty at the end of Case I is given by substi· 
turing the value of 9 at the end of Case I {{E + G) I H), into the equation for the critical 
probability in Case I, equation 12: 
p' (�) G 
H 9(H - H.) 
G 
�(H - H.l 
H 
Simtlarly, the critical probability at the beginning of Case II is given by substitunng 9 • 
(E + G) I H into the equation for the critical probability in Case II, equanon 14: 
p' (�) G G H G + E - 9H, G + E _ .:...(E_+_::G:..:..:)H.� H 
G 
�(H - H.) H 
Because the values for p' are equal, the path is continuous with an tnflecnon potnt at 9 • 
(E + G) I H-the border between Cases I and II. 
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maximum deterrent effect when a is set at (E + G) I H, the boundary 
between Cases I and II.  
If the latter applies, then the path is as illustrated in Figure 3: 
9" • £  H. 
Severity of Penalties, 9 
IV 
FIGURE 3: THE KNIFE-EDGED VERSION OF THE PERVERSE EFFECT 
Once again, the bold line separates products that continue to be 
produced from those that are discontinued, and the dotted line, this time 
throughout Case Ill as well as in the beginning of Case I, implies that the 
manufacturer will continue production in these ranges even if the 
probability that the product is harmful equals 1. As in Figure 2, p' is a 
decreasing function of a in Case I. However, as a increases beyond Case I, 
p' jumps, so that no risky projects will be deterred when the firm is in Case 
Ill. As in Figure 2, the maximum deterrent effect is achieved when a is set 
at the end of Case I, which now occurs when a = E I H0• However, if a is 
set slightly larger, the liability regime will not deter any products from 
being sold. Thus, there is a knife-edge effect: when a is set near the edge of 
Case I,  a slight increase in the level of tort penalties can eliminate the 
entire deterrent effect of the tort system. 
Obviously, only one path can apply for a given risk at any time. 
Whether Figure 2 or Figure 3 applies depends upon whether, as the value of 
a increases, the manufacturer first becomes bankrupt when production 
To establish the second claim, the critical probability at the end of Case II is given by substi· 
tuting the value of 9 at the end of Case II (E I H.,), into the equation for the critical probabtlity 
in Case II, equation 14: 
' ( E ) _  G p - -H. G + E - 9H, = I .  
Because the critical probabtltty throughout Case IV IS I ,  the path is continuous across the 
border between Cases II and IV. 
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continues or ceases. That, in tum, depends upon the relative size of the 
potential increase in equity to the potential increase in harm from 
continuing production. If the potential increase in equity is proportionally 
smaller,29 then the manufacturer is bankrupt first if production continues, 
and the effect of increasing tort penalties is described by Figure 2. 
Conversely, if the potential increase in equity from continuing production 
is proportionally larger than the increase in harm,JO then the manufacturer 
is bankrupt first if production ceases, and the effect of increasing tort 
penalties is described by Figure 3. Thus, if there are high start-up costs, 
profit margins are increasing, and the manufacturer has no other profitable 
products, then as e increases, bankruptcy will first occur if production 
ceases, and so the path will resemble Figure 3. Alternatively, if start-up 
costs are low, profit margins are falling, and the manufacturer has other 
profitable products, then as e increases, bankruptcy will first occur if 
production continues, and so the path will resemble Figure 2. 
The paths described in Figure 2 and Figure 3 should be contrasted 
with the standard view of the effect of stiffer tort penalties. The standard 
view, portrayed in Figure 1, is that the critical probability at first falls and 
then levels off once the tortfeasor's wealth is exhausted. However, neither 
Figure 2 nor Figure 3 describes a decreasing function that reaches a floor at 
which it thereafter remains. In both Figures 2 and 3, the critical prob­
ability reaches a minimum. Once the minimum is reached, the critical 
probability rises continuously along the first path; with the second path, 
once the minimum is reached, the critical probability immediately jumps 
to 1. In both figures, it returns to a level at which production will stop 
only if p = 1 .  
As described in Section II.B, the standard view-that increasing the 
stiffness of tort penalties has no additional deterrent effect once the point 
of bankruptcy is reached-applies only when there are no prior potential 
liabilities that can be increased by raising penalties. That is likely to be 
true for many kinds of torts, such as accidents, but it is only true for 
products liability matters before any sales occur. Once sales have occurred, 
the situation is more complex and the results are different. When there are 
preexisting sales, stiffer tort penalties will increase deterrence to a point, 
but then they will reduce deterrence. 
29. That is, the rauoofthe equity if production continues to the initial equity((E +G) I E) 
is less than the ratio of the harm from continued producuon to the harm if production ceases 
(H I H,). 
30. That is, the ratio of the equity from contmuing production to the initial equity 
( (E +G) I E) exceeds the rauo of the harm from continuing production to the harm from ceasing 
production (H I H0). 
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Therefore, the lesson that emerges is one of caution: increasing tort 
penalties might cause firms to continue to produce risky products that they 
would have withdrawn from the market had penalties been lower. 
Although manufacturers would have the proper incentives to make the 
efficient decision if the liability system set e = 1 ,  and so the full cost of any 
harm is internalized, that is true only if e = 1 occurs in Case I. If e = 1 does 
not occur in Case I, then the best that can be done to prevent manu­
facturers from inefficiently maintaining dangerous products on the market 
is to set e at the end of Case r.>• 
D. The Intuition Behind the Perverse Result 
The law-and-economics literature has long recognized the possibility 
that, because of limited liability, the deterrent effect of stiffer tort penalties 
disappears once the defendant's wealth is exhausted.>2 However, this 
Article makes a stronger claim: There is a range over which higher 
penalties will encourage manufacturers to continue to produce riskier 
products that they would withdraw with lower penalties.>l The intuition 
behind that result is driven by an asymmetry created by limited liability. 
The entire upside from continuing production-the additional profit if the 
product is not dangerous--is enjoyed by the firm's equityholders, but the 
3 1 .  There is literature devoted to providing reasons why 9 should nor equal I ,  to which 
this Article contributes. See, e.g., Jennifer H. Arlen, Recoruilkring Eff�eutnt Tort Ruks for Ptrsonal 
Injury: The Case of Single Acn11ity Accidtnu, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 41,  81-86 ( 1990) (arguing 
that efficiency does nor require the full compensation of damages in single-activity accidents that 
impose reciprocal risks). For the purpose of illustration, I ignore the rest of that literature. The 
results of that literature, however, could easily be incorporated. If, for reasons other than those 
provided in this Article, 9 should have a value other than I ,  then 9 should be set at the lesser of 
that level or towards the end of Case I. 
32. See genaaU:t Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 2; Shavell, supra note 2. 
33. The Article has rhus far looked at the problem from the perspective of a manufacturer 
deciding whether to remove a product from the marker. The Article has not considered the pos­
sibtlity of the manufacturer reducing the potential of harm by modifying the product. It is easy 
to apply the model to such dectsions. Assume that the manufacturer is deciding whether to 
produce a dtfferent version of the product that, at some cost to itself, will produce less harm if 
dangerous. In thts case, the decision to continue production described in the model becomes the 
dectsion nor to modtfy the product. Similarly, the decision to discontinue production becomes 
the decision ro modify the product. With this transformation, G represents the cost of modifying 
the product, and E tS the equity after raking into account future sales. Assuming that the manu­
facturer would be bankrupt tf it does not modify the product and the product proves to be dan­
gerous, bur would nor be bankrupt if it modifies the product, then raising the penalty reduces the 
expected cost to the manufacturer if it chooses not ro modify the product. Because raising the 
penalty lowers the cost to rhe manufacturer of nor modifying the product, higher penalties will 
reduce the like! ihood that the product will be modified. 
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downside-the liability award paid if the product is dangerous-is trun­
cated by limited liability.H 
Regardless of whether production continues or ceases, raising tort 
penalties increases the penalty assessed against the manufacturer if the 
product is dangerous. So long as the manufacturer can pay the full penalty 
if the product is dangerous (Case I), then raising tort penalties increases 
the additional penalty the manufacturer pays if it continues production­
the difference between the penalty the manufacturer pays if it continues 
production and the penalty if it ceases production. However, if the manu­
facturer is bankrupt only if it continues production, but not if it ceases pro­
duction (Case II), then further increasing tort penalties reduces the 
additional penalty the manufacturer pays if production continues. This is 
because raising penalties only increases the penalty the manufacturer pays 
if production ceases.JS Thus, limited liability creates the perverse effect by 
reducing the additional penalty that the manufacturer pays if it continues 
production. This additional penalty falls as penalties rise, until the manu­
facturer is bankrupt if it ceases production. Once the manufacturer is at 
this point (Case IV), it pays the same penalty whether it continues or 
ceases production and so it always continues production.36 
34. It iJ worth emphasizing that the perverse effect is not eliminated by raiJing penalties 
only on firms that are not bankrupt. For example, imposing punitive damages only on solvent 
firms would discourage those firms from continuing production that would be solvent if the 
product iJ dangerous and if production continues. However, punitive damages would not dis· 
courage production by those firms that would be bankrupt if production continues and the 
product is dangerous. Indeed, punitive damages would encourage such firms to continue 
production if there is any chance that they will be subject to punitive damage in the event that 
they cease production. In this case, punitive damages reduce the current net equity of the 
corporation, thereby reducing what the equityholders stand to lose from continuing production. 
Thus, such punitive damages are more likely to exacerbate rather than eliminate the problem. 
Of course, punitive damages would diSCourage risk-taking activity if the manufacturer was still in 
Case I after taking the punitive damages into account. 
35. The penalty the manufacturer will pay 1f production continues cannot increase 
because the manufacturer will be bankrupt if the product is dangerous. 
36. An analogy can be drawn between the two paths presented here and the Laffer Curve, 
which relates federal tax revenues to tax rates. The endpoints of the Laffer Curve are well 
defined: there is no tax revenue 1f the tax rate is either 0% or 100%. (When the tax rate is 100% 
there is no activity and therefore no revenue.) As the tax rate increases above 0, revenue ini· 
tially increases. At some pomt, however, revenue starts to decline. Efficiency in tax collection 
requires that the tax system charge a rate that is not above the point at which tax revenue iJ at a 
maximum. 
Figure 2 represents a sim1lar path for liability awards. When the liability award is very low, 
production always continues because the penalty iJ not sufficient to deter the manufacturer from 
ceasing production, even if p • I .  When the liability award iJ very high, the manufacrurer will 
be wiped out if the product is dangerous and will therefore conunue production if p < I ,  because 
it has nothing to lose by conunumg. For Intermediate values of 0, the tort system will discourage 
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This rationale also explains the difference between Figure 1 and 
Figure 2. When there are no prior sales on which the penalty can be 
assessed if the product is dangerous, the additional penalty the manu­
facturer pays if it starts production cannot fall as penalties rise. Instead, 
once the point of bankruptcy is reached (Case F), there is no additional 
deterrent effect from stiffer penalties. Accordingly, in Figure 1, the critical 
probability levels off. In contrast, in Figure 2, the critical probability falls 
and then rises.J7 
The intuition behind Figure 3 is a more extreme version of that 
behind Figure 2. Once the firm is bankrupt if it ceases production of a 
dangerous product, but not if it continues production (Case III), then it 
can only gain by continuing production. This is because the manufacturer's 
equity if it continues production is higher when the product is not dan­
gerous, and it is at least as high when it is dangerous.38 Accordingly, once 
the firm is in Case III, the deterrent effect of stiffer penalties disappears 
entirely and production always continues. 
E. Summary 
This part has shown that for a manufacturer with preexisting sales, 
there is a range within which stiffer tort penalties will lead the manu-
some projects. As the stiffness of penalties increases, production will be discontinued for lower 
values of p. At some point, the deterrent effect iJ at a maximum, and depending on whether 
Case II or Case Ill follows Case I, either increasingly risky projects will not be deterred or the 
deterrent effect will be immediately eliminated. 
37. The perverse effect described in this Article is different than the one described by 
Professor Jennifer Arlen, who argues that strict vicarious liability might be counterproductive. 
Because the information gathered to monitor managers and deter fraud often ends up being used 
against the firm in a civil or criminal action, strict liability discourages monitoring. Professor 
Arlen has shown that this effect might outweigh the potential benefit to the firm of the addi· 
tiona! fraud deterred. Therefore, this effect might lead firms to do less monitoring. &e Jennifer 
Arlen, � Porn�tullly Pm.otne Effects of Corporau Cmnmal Uabtlity, 23 J. LEGAL STuD. 833 
(199�). 
The perverse effect described in th1s Article u also d1fferent from the one descnbed by 
Professor Rohan Pitchford. See Rohan Pitchford, How Uab� Should a unda Be! � Case of 
]udg�mnr-Proof Firms and Environmental Risk, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1 1 7 1  (1995). Professor 
Pitchford shows that increasing a lender's liability for its borrowers' environmental liabilities 
might increase the frequency of such accidents. See id. at 1 173. The intuition behind that result 
iJ that increasing lender liabihty increases the interest rate on the lender's loan, which reduces 
the borrower's equity in the no-accident state. The less attractive the no-accident state is, the 
fewer precautions a borrower will take to avoid the rule of an environmental accident and, 
therefore, the greater the incidence of such accidents. &e rd. at 1 177-78. 
38. Assuming the product is dangerous, in Case Ill, the manufacturer's eqUity is higher tf it 
continues production; m Case IV, the equity is the same (0) whether production continues 
or ceases. 
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facturer to continue producing a product that it would have removed from 
the market with less stiff penalties. 
Ill. THE PREVALENCE OF THE PERVERSE EFFECT 
Recognizing that a range exists in which the perverse effect occurs 
says nothing about where it occurs. Where that range begins is crucial to 
determining how widespread the perverse effect is. If the perverse effect 
occurs only at very high penalty levels, then few, if any, firms will be 
affected, and the problem is largely of academic interest. If, however, the 
perverse effect can occur at fairly low penalty levels, then potentially many 
firms will be affected and the problem is an important one with substantial 
real-world consequences. This part focuses on the question of how stiff 
penalties must be in order for the perverse effect to occur. The analysis 
reveals that the perverse effect is likely to occur at very low penalty levels, 
especially when the potential harm is great and when the manufacturer 
produces only one product. 
This part is divided into three sections. The first section examines 
how the outer border of Case I, the point at which the perverse effect 
occurs, is affected by changing various parameters. The second section uses 
that analysis to show that the perverse effect is likely to occur for many 
manufacturers, even if penalties are weak. The third section extends the 
analysis to explain why the perverse effect is most closely related to mass 
torts. 
A. Comparative Statics 
This section examines how changing various parameters changes the 
outer boundary of Case I, the point at which the perverse effect appears. 
This exercise begins with the boundary conditions. The boundary between 
Cases I and II, denoted 8', occurs when 8H - G = E.J9 Thus, 
(19) e· = E + G 
H 
39. This can be seen as follows: Case I occurs when E > 9H - G, 91-1,, and Case II occurs 
when 9H-G > E > 9Ho- Thus, the boundary between Cases I and II occurs when 9H - G • E. 
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The boundary between Cases I and III, denoted 8", occurs when 8H0 
= E.40 Thus, 
(20) f)" = E 
Ho 
Consider first the border between Cases I and II (equation 19). That 
border is a function of three parameters: E (the current equity), G (the gain 
from continuing production), and H (the total harm). Consistent with 
intuition, the border is further out the greater E and G are and the smaller 
H is. 
Recall that Case II begins at the point at which the firm would just be 
bankrupt if it continued production and the product were dangerous. 
Accordingly, the larger the equity, E, the more severe the level of penalties 
must be in order to force the firm into bankruptcy. Similarly, the greater 
the gain from continuing production, G, the more money the firm will 
have available to pay claims if production continues and the product is 
dangerous. Consequently, the greater the gain from continued sales, the 
more severe the penalty level must be in order to force the firm into 
bankruptcy. On the other hand, the greater the potential total harm from 
continued production, H, the less severe the level of penalties must be to 
push the firm into bankruptcy. 
A similar analysis can be conducted for the border between Cases I 
and III (equation 20). The border between Cases I and III is extended by 
increasing E and contracted by increasing H0 (the harm if production 
ceases). This is also consistent with intuition. Case III begins at the 
penalty level at which the firm would just be bankrupt if it stopped pro­
duction and the product were dangerous. The larger the equity, the stiffer 
penalties must be to drive the manufacturer into bankruptcy. In addition, 
the greater the level of harm caused, the less stiff penalties need be in order 
to force the manufacturer into bankruptcy. 
B. The Prevalence of the Perverse Effect 
This Article has described how stiff tort penalties can cause firms to 
keep products on the market that they would have withdrawn if penalties 
40. This can be seen as follows: Case I occurs when E > 9H - G, OH.,. and Case lll occurs 
when OH0 > E > OH - G. Thus, the boundary between Cases I and lll occurs when 91-1, � E. 
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were lower. Although this perverse effect is possible, not all firms are at 
the point at which this effect occurs. Some firms are in the region in 
which stiffer penalties will have the usual effect of discouraging production 
of less risky products. Accordingly, the most important issue this Article 
raises is the prevalence of the perverse effect. 
Although the answer to such a question is ultimately empirical, the 
perverse effect is probably widespread because it can occur at very low 
penalty levels that are substantially below full compensation. The perverse 
effect occurs when the manufacturer would first become bankrupt, which 
would occur no later than when e = (E + G) I H. Thus, when the potential 
harm exceeds the manufacturer's equity, including the profit from further 
sales, the perverse effect will occur below full compensation. 
The perverse effect is, however, deferred if the manufacturer has other 
profitable products, because the additional equity must be exhausted before 
bankruptcy occurs. Returning to the example in Part I (in which the 
equity is $12 million, the gain from additional sales is $1 million, the 
potential harm from prior sales is $4 million, and the potential harm from 
additional sales is $16 million), the perverse effect begins when e = 0.65.41 
If the equity were only $6 million, the perverse effect would occur when e 
- 0.35.42 F h a I or t e perverse enect not to set in unti compensation is 
complete (9 = 1), the equity must be $19 million. 
Moreover, not only can the perverse effect occur at a low penalty 
level, it can also have a large effect on the critical probability. The tort 
system has the greatest deterrent effect when the manufacturer is at the 
end of Case l. Once penalties are raised high enough, so that the manu­
facturer is in Case IV, the entire deterrent effect disappears. Returning 
again to the example from Part I, tort penalties have their maximum 
deterrent effect when e = 0.65. In this case, the critical probability 
41. Th., J)"rve= effect begins in Case II. Substituting the parameter values into equation 
19 yields: 
e· • � = Q = 0.65 . 
16 + 4 zo 
42. The substitution yields: 
9 = 6 + 1 1 
16 + 4 zo 
035. 
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is 0.096.4> Increasing tort penalties from 65% to 300% of any harm caused 
will encourage the manufacturer to produce the product regardless of the 
probability that the product is dangerous. Thus, while the manufacturer 
would have removed the product had that probability been greater than 
0.096 and the penalty had been 65% of any harm, when the penalty is 
three times the harm, the manufacturer will not withdraw the product if 
there is any chance it is not dangerous. 
Thus, it is clear from this simple example that the perverse effect can 
have a significant impact and has the potential to affect many firms. It is 
also clear that the problem is more likely to occur the less diversified that a 
manufacturer's product line is. In addition, the perverse effect is more 
likely to occur the greater the potential harm. 
C. Application to Mass Torts 
As described in Section liLA, the greater the harm caused if the 
product is dangerous, the lower the penalty level at which the perverse 
effect occurs. As described below, the potential harm is greatest when the 
risk of injury is highly correlated across users. This suggests that the 
perverse effect is most likely to occur with mass torts 
With many goods, there is little uncertainty about the aggregate level 
of injuries that will occur. A common example from torts casebooks is soda 
bottles that either blow up or contain animal parts. Based on past expe­
rience, a large company can predict with reasonable confidence both the 
number of such occurrences and the magnitude of the resulting injuries. 
Today, the same thing can be said for tobacco, silicone breast implants, and 
asbestos, except that the numbers are much higher. There was a time, 
however, when such connections were less clear. At that time, the differ­
ence between soda bottles and asbestos existed in the variance of possible 
43. The critical probability at the end of Case I is given by substituting 9 • (E + 0) I H 
into �uauon 12. Thus, 
E + 0 OH 
p' (-H-) • (E + O)(H - H.) 
Substituting for the parameters yields 0.096: 
p(0.65) = l.ZO = 0.096 . 
( 1 2  + I)(ZO - 4) 
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injuries. If asbestos were not harmful, there would be no or very few inju­
ries. Conversely, if it were harmful, the number of people affected would be 
staggering. Thus, there was a lot of aggregate product risk from asbestos 
because of the high correlation of risk across users. On the other hand, 
soda bottles produced much less aggregate uncertainty from the manu­
facturer's standpoint. Only a few bottles would be defective, and the total 
number of defects could be predicted with considerable accuracy, even if 
the defective bottles could not be identified in advance. As a result, the 
bottles had low volatility, whereas asbestos had high volatility. 
When there is little aggregate risk, because the manufacturer is fairly 
sure of having to make some payments, E is smaller. However, H is also 
smaller because it is unlikely that the manufacturer will have to make 
many large payments. On the other hand, when there is high aggregate 
product risk, both E and H are higher. For risks with equal expected 
liability judgments, the manufacturer is generally more likely to produce a 
product for which the risks are highly correlated. Thus, the perverse effect 
is more likely to occur with products whose risk is highly correlated than 
with products whose risk is weakly correlated.� 
The level of tort penalties at which the perverse effect occurs is also 
affected by technological and economic developments. With soda bottles, 
the manufacturer will quickly learn the rate of failures. However, with 
asbestos, it might take many years to learn whether the product is harm­
ful.45 The longer it takes to determine whether the product is dangerous, 
the more sales will occur before the issue is resolved.46 More sales implies 
44. Assume that the aggregate risk from a weakly correlated risk is smaller than H ( H - X) 
and that there will be injuries of at least p'X. The border between Cases I and II with a weakly 
correlated risk, the point at which the perverse effect begins, 08 ·, is given by: 
a: = E - pX + G 
H - X 
Comparing e· to 9a. and rearranging the terms yields: 
9' _:: 9,' as pH _:: E + G . 
< < 
Thus, if the firm's expected cqu1ty from continuing production when the risk is perfectly corre· lated (E + G) IS �ess than the expected harm (pH), the perverse effect begins at a lower penalty level when the nsk IS perfectly correlated; otherwise, it begins at a lower level when the risk 15 
weakly correlated. 
45. Su Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Untkmandmg Mass Perrona! Injury 
Linganon: A Soc•o·l..tgal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 961, 1016 (1993). 
46. Goods can be divided into inspection goods, experience goods, and credence goods, 
based on how 
.
easy it is to asce�tain their qualities at low cost. The quality of inspection goods can be determmed by observauon before purchase (for example, the ripeness of fresh fruit); the 
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greater profits from additional sales, G; but, it also implies a larger potential 
liability if the product is dangerous, H. Thus, the longer it takes to resolve 0 od 0 47 the uncertainty, the stronger the incentive to contmue pr ucuon. 
Economic developments might also have reduced the level at which 
the perverse effect occurs. Larger and more competitive markets have the 
tendency to increase sales proportionally more than profits. This suggests 
that G has probably declined relative to H, which would cause the perverse 
effect to occur at lower levels of 0.48 
The implication is that there is reason to believe that economic and 
technological developments have increased the number of firms subject to 
the perverse effect. Thus, it is possible that today there are more products 
on the market that would be withdrawn if penalties were not as stiff than 
there were in the past. 
D. Summary 
This part has revealed what features characterize those firms that are 
most likely to be subject to the perverse effect. The perverse effect is most 
likely to occur when equity and profitability are low and the potential 
harm is high. The latter is most likely to take place when risks are corre­
lated, which occurs most obviously with mass torts. In addition, this part 
has shown that many firms might be subject to the perverse effect, which 
can occur at low penalty levels. 
IV. NEGLIGENCE 
Part II showed that under a strict liability regime, stiffer tort penalties 
will, over some range, encourage firms to continue to produce risky prod­
ucts that they would withdraw from the market if penalties were less stiff. 
This part extends that result to a negligence regime. This discussion is 
quality of expenence goods requires use (for example, the relative amounts of fruit and syrup in 
canned fruit}; and the quality of credence goods might not be revealed even after substanual usc 
(for example, the health consequences of pesticides used on fruit). See M1chael R. Darby & Ed1 
Kami, Free Compenrion and w Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 j.L. & ECON. 67, 68-69 (1973). 
Compared with 100 years ago, there are many more expenence and credence goods today. Su 
WIUIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POsNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 284-
8 5  (198 7). The growth in credence goods is responsible for the increased time it often takes to 
determine whether a product is dangerous. 
4 7. Increasing both G and H by the same proportion, k, contracts the border between 
Cases I and II. That is, (E + G) I H > (E + Gk) I Hk, for E >  0 and k > I. 
48. lncreasmg H more than G contracts the border between Cases I and II. That is, 
(E + G) I H > (E + Gk) I Hk', for k >  I and k' > k. 
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more complicated than the discussion of strict liability because there is an 
added level of uncertainty with negligence. When enforcement is imper­
fect, there is, in addition to uncertainty about whether the product is dan­
gerous, uncertainty about whether the defendant will be found negligent 
and will be held liable. 
The first section illustrates that when the negligence regime is per­
fectly enforced, so that there are no mistakes in assessing liability, the 
perverse effect does not occur. The second section then shows that the 
perverse effect does occur when enforcement is imperfect, such that a party 
might be held negligent when it is not negligent or might not be held 
negligent when it is. The third section then compares strict liability and 
negligence in terms of the stiffness of the tort penalties required to produce 
the perverse effect and shows that the perverse effect will require higher 
penalties in a negligence regime. 
A. Perfect Enforcement 
Negligence differs from strict liability in that the manufacturer is 
liable for injuries caused by its product only if the manufacturer has been 
negligent in some way. As applied to the decision whether to continue 
producing a product that might be dangerous, the manufacturer is liable 
only for injuries resulting from negligent sales. Assume, for example, that 
the manufacturer has not been negligent in selling the product so far, but it 
would be negligent if it continued to sell the product. Consequently, if the 
manufacturer ceases production, it will not be liable for any injuries that 
might be caused by its product. 
The negligence rule can be made operational by assuming that there is 
a minimum probability of the product being dangerous, P .. .  below which 
continuing to sell is not negligent but above which it is. Thus, the 
negligence rule creates three possibilities: ( 1 )  the earlier, lower probability 
and the current, higher probability are both below the negligence thresh­
old; (2) both probabilities are above the negligence threshold; and (3) the 
probabilities straddle the threshold. 
The first possibility, in which both probabilities are below the negli­
gence threshold, is easy to examine: because the manufacturer faces no 
liability by continuing production, production will continue. The second 
possibility, in which both probabilities are above the negligence threshold, 
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is similar to the strict liability regime considered in Part ll:49 further sales 
might occur, despite the higher probability of injury, because a portion of 
the liability is externalized. 
The most interesting and important possibility is the third one, in 
which the probability increase crosses the negligence threshold. This 
possibility is the most significant because it is at this point that the law 
aims to stop production. Although there are circumstances in which the 
manufacturer will proceed, negligence law has a lot of stopping power. 
That power comes because liability will be assessed only if the manu· 
facturer continues to sell past the negligence threshold. Accordingly, when 
the manufacturer crosses the threshold probability, stiffer penalties will not 
encourage manufacturers to continue production. If the manufacturer will 
not be bankrupt if a judgment is assessed against it, stiffer penalties will 
discourage continuing production. If it will be bankrupt, stiffer penalties 
will neither encourage nor discourage manufacturers from continuing. 
Thus, with a perfectly enforced negligence standard, unlike with strict 
liabiliry, raising the liability award will not encourage firms to continue to 
produce at higher probabilities than otherwise and consequently does not 
generally have the perverse effect described in Part II. It does have such an 
effect, however, when the negligence standard is imperfectly enforced. 
B. Imperfect Enforcement 
Slightly more than ten years ago, John Calfee and Richard Craswell 
showed that when the negligence standard is imperfectly enforced, many of 
the conclusions about the consequences of adopting a negligence rule must 
be revised.50 In the same way, the above analysis of the effect of higher 
liability awards on the extemalization of product risks must be revised to 
account for an imperfectly enforced negligence standard. The most plau­
sible way of modelling uncertainty surrounding the negligence standard is 
to assume that the conditional probability of being held liable (assuming 
the product is dangerous) is an increasing function of the probability 
49. The analysiS is similar, but not equivalent, to the analysis for strict liabll1ry, because 
the manufacturer is not liable for the harm from all saler-unless selling even the firsr umt was 
negligent. . . 
50. See John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, SOfll( Effects of Uncertamcy on Complumce wlfh 
l..tgal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 974-84 (1984). 
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that the product is dangerous when the decision to continue was made. If 
the probability that the manufacturer is held liable, assuming that the 
product is dangerous, is denoted as q(p; p..), with q'>O, then 1 - q is the 
probability that the manufacturer will not be held liable. 
To simplify the model and parallel the strict liability discussion, 
assume there is no possibility that the manufacturer will be held liable if 
the product is not dangerous. Accordingly, the manufacturer will pay a 
judgment only if: (1) the product is dangerous, which has probability p; and 
(2) the manufacturer is adjudged negligent, which has conditional prob­
ability q. Thus, the probability that the manufacturer will be held liable is 
pq. In calculating the manufacturer's expected gain from continuing 
production, there are two values of q that must be taken into account. The 
conditional probability of being held liable if production ceases is flo• and 
the conditional probability if production continues is q.. with q1 > <Jo· 
Accordingly, the firm's expected equity from continuing production can be 
written as: 
(21 )  C = E + G - pq1min(E + G, SH) . 
Similarly, the expected equity from ceasing production is given by: 
(22) D = E - pq.,min(E, 8H0) • 
Thus, the expected net gain from continuing production (the 
difference between equations 21 and 22) is given by: 
1. 
(23) X = C - D = (1 - Mo)G - p[q.min(E, SH - G) 
- CJomin(E, e�)) . 
Four Cases 
As with strict liability, there are four cases to consider depending upon 
the value of e. For each case, the expected gain from continuing 
production and the critical value of p are set out in the following table. 
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Case Expected Gain from Critical Probability, 
Continuing Production, X = t>' = 
( 1  - Mo + pqi)G G 
I p8(q1H - <IoH0) (<Jo - q)G + e(qH - <Iol-\) -
( 1  - Mo)G 
II - p(q,E - qoeHo) 
( 1  - pq0 + pq1)G 
I l l  - pq18H + pq0E 
(1 - pqo)G 
IV p(ql - qo)E -
G 
� G + q E - q eHo 
I 0 
G 
(q0 - q)G + q18H - q0E 
G 
qp + q1E - CloE 
Case I: The manufacturer is never bankrupt. 
In this case, the critical probability falls as e increases, just as it did 
with strict liability.51 The intuition is similar to what it was with strict 
liability: increasing the value of e increases the expected penalty by a larger 
amount if production continues than if production ceases. 
Case II: The manufacturer is bankrupt when the product is dangerous 
and it is held liable, but only if production continues and not if production 
ceases. 
In this case, the critical probability rises as the value of e increases, 
just as it did with strict liability.52 This is the perverse effect, whereby 
stiffer penalties encourage the production of riskier products. Under the 
assumption that the negligence standard is imperfectly enforced, the 
51. In Case I, the critical probability in a negligence reg1me is a decreasing function of 
9, because 9 enters positively into the denominator. . . 
52. In Case II, the critical probability in a negligence reg•me is an mcreasmg funcuon of 
9, because 9 enters negatively into the denominator. 
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intuition for the perverse effect in Case II is similar to what it was with 
strict liability: increasing the stiffness of tort penalties reduces the manu­
facturer's expected equity if production ceases but has no effect if pro­
duction continues. Thus, increasing tort penalties, by reducing the amount 
the manufacturer risks by continuing production, encourages continued 
production of potentially dangerous products. 
Case III: The manufacturer is bankrupt when the product is dangerous 
and it is held liable, but only if production ceases and not if production 
continues. 
Unlike Cases I or II, the effect of increasing tort penalties in Case III 
is very different with negligence than with strict liability. In a strict 
liability regime, a manufacturer in Case III  will always continue pro­
duction. In contrast, in a negligence regime, increasing tort penalties 
reduces the critical probability throughout Case Ill .  The intuition behind 
the latter effect is that the conditional probability of being held liable 
(assuming the product is dangerous) is greater if production continues, q,, 
than if it ceases, q0• Thus, unlike a strict liability regime, in which there is 
no cost to the manufacturer from continuing production in Case III, 
because the manufacturer is bankrupt if production ceases and the product 
is dangerous, there is such a cost in a negligence regime. The cost of 
continuing production in a negligence regime is that the manufacturer is 
more likely to be held liable if it continues production than if it ceases 
production. Moreover, the assumption that the manufacturer can pay the 
liability if it continues production but not if it ceases production implies 
that the penalty paid if production is continued increases as penalties 
stiffen. Thus, the critical probability is a decreasing function of e, and 
there is no perverse effect. 
Case IV: The manufacturer is bankrupt if it is held liable, regardless of 
whether it continues or ceases production. 
The effect of increasing the value of e on the critical probability in 
Case IV is also different with negligence than with strict liability. In a 
strict liability regime, a manufacturer will continue production unless the 
product is certain to be dangerous. In a negligence regime, the critical 
probability in Case IV is fixed and independent of e. That probability 
might be greater than l ,  in which case production will always continue, or 
it might be a fixed value between 0 and l .  Once again, the intuition is that 
the cost to the manufacturer of continuing production is the larger condi­
tional probability of being held liable (assuming the product is dangerous) 
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if production continues than if production ceases. 53 Thus, in Case IV, the 
manufacturer balances the higher probability of bankruptcy if production 
continues and it is held liable, against the higher equity if production 
continues and it is not held liable. Because the manufacturer's equity in 
every possible state is independent of e, the critical probability is also 
independent of e. 
2. The Two Paths 
As with strict liability, there are two possible paths for the critical 
probability. As the value of e increases, the path will consist of either 
Cases I ,  I I ,  and IV; or Cases I, Ill, and IV. When the path contains Case 
Il l ,  the path is similar to the traditional view of increasing tort penalties,H 
as illustrated by Figure 4: 
I • • • •  
Cnru:al 
Probaboloty, p' 
Ill IV 
Severity of Penalties, 9 
FIGURE 4: THE TRADITIONAL VIEW OF STIFFER TORT PENAL TIES 
WITH NEGLIGENCE 
Figure 4 shows that the critical probability decreases continuously 
throughout Cases I and I l l .  At the end of Case III ,  it reaches a floor at 
which it remains throughout Case IV. Thus, when the path contains Case 
Il l ,  there is no perverse effect. This is very different from the path with 
strict liability, which exhibited a knife-edged perverse effect at the 
beginning of Case I l l. 
53. That is, q, > q.,. 
54. Su supra p. 109. 
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In contrast, when the path contains Case II, the path exhibits the 
perverse effect as it did with strict liability, as illustrated by Figure 5: 
I • • . .  
Critical 
Probability,p' 
E + G  
H 
II 
&verity of Penalties, 9 
IV 
FIGURE 5: THE PERVERSE EFFECf WITH NEGLIGENCE 
When the path contains Case II, the critical probability is a 
decreasing function of a throughout Case I until the minimum critical 
probability is reached at the end of that case. Once that point is reached, 
the critical probability is an increasing function of a throughout Case II. 
At that point, the critical probability reaches a plateau, at which it remains 
throughout Case IV. In Case IV, increasing tort penalties has no additional 
deterrent effect, although tort penalties have some deterrent effect. Thus, 
with negligence, as with strict liability, the critical probability is a U­
shaped function of a. Once again, therefore, this time in a negligence 
regime, stiffer penalties might encourage firms to continue to produce 
increasingly dangerous products that they would have withdrawn from the 
market were penalties less stiff. 
C. Comparing Liability Regimes 
When the path contains Case III, the perverse effect occurs with strict 
liability but not with negligence. This is one way in which the perverse 
effect is more likely to occur with strict liability than with negligence. 
There is also a second way in which the perverse effect is more likely to 
occur with strict liability. When the path contains Case II, the outer 
border of Case I occurs at a lower level of a with strict liability than with 
negligence. The rest of this section compares the border between Cases I 
and II with strict liability and negligence. 
In order to make this comparison, it is useful to consider, in addition 
to the standard negligence rule that imposes liability only on injuries that 
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result from the tortfeasor's negligent conduct, a modified negligence rule 
that assesses liability on earlier, nonnegligent sales if the tortfeasor is later 
negligent. The difference in the harm from nonnegligent sales for which 
the tortfeasor is liable with these two versions of the negligence rule, HN, is 
assumed to be a constant that is independent of whether production is 
continued or discontinued. 
Because both H and H0 are reduced by HN/5 a negligence rule that 
does not assess liability on any nonnegligent sales extends Case I further 
out than a negligence rule that looks back to the first sale.56 Similarly, the 
far border for Case II is also extended by a negligence rule that assesses a 
penalty only on negligent sales. 57 
The boundaries are the same with strict liability and with a negligence 
rule that looks back to the first sale.58 The boundaries are extended if the 
negligence rule does not look back to the first sale. Moreover, the more 
55. Because H ... the nonnegligent sales, are a constant, the difference between H and H0 is 
the same with both the standard negligence rule and the look-back rule. 
56. This can be seen as follows: Denote the boundary between Cases I and II by 9', with 
either a subscript "N" or "L" to denote the negligence rule either without or with a look back to 
the first sale. Thus, the boundaries are given by: 
and 
E + G  e ' : --• H 
E + G 
9 ' a -=.._____::.._ ' H - H. 
Because H .. is positive, 9L' is greater than e .. • .  Thus, the boundary between Cases I and II i.! 
further out with a negligence rule that does not look back to the first sale. 
57. This can be �en as follows: Denote the boundary between � II and IV by 9", with 
enher a subscnpt "N" or "L". (I use the notation 9" becau� the boundary between Cases II and 
IV. when the path contains Cases I, II, and IV. is the same as the boundary between � I and 
I II, when the path contains Cases I, Ill, and IV. Thus, the boundaries are given by: 
and 
E 
9 ,  = -• 
H. 
E 
Because H,. is positive, 9." is greater than 9,.". Thus, the boundary between Cases II and IV 
is further out with a neglagence rule that does not look back to the first sale. 
58. This follows from notes 56 and 57, which �t the boundaries between the regions. 
When H,.· 0, 9',. = e·L and 9",.- 9"L· 
134 45 UCLA LAW REVIEW 99 ( 1997) 
sales that escape liability, the further out are the boundaries. 59 Thus, with a 
negligence rule that assesses liability only on negligent sales, there are 
values of e for which the firm would be in Case I, whereas with strict liabil­
ity or a negligence rule that looks back to the first sale, it would be in Case 
II. Thus, for a given level of e, the perverse effect is more widespread when 
liability is assessed only on negligent sales.60 Thus, it seems likely that 
because of the tendency over the past thirty-five years for courts to replace 
negligence with strict liability in products liability matters, the perverse 
effect is more widespread today than it was a generation ago.61 
D. Summary 
Part IV has shown that the perverse effect also exists in a negligence 
regime with imperfect enforcement. Unlike with strict liability, the 
perverse effect exists only if the path contains Case II. Moreover, the 
knife-edged perverse effect, which existed with strict liability, does not 
exist with negligence. This part has also shown that the perverse effect 
will occur at the same level of e with both strict liability and a negligence 
rule that looks back to the first sale. However, the perverse effect will 
require a higher level of e when liability is assessed only on negligent sales. 
V. AVENUES FOR FuRTHER RESEARCH 
There are several ways to modify the analysis in this Article. For 
example, throughout this Article I have looked at just one actor, the owner 
of the firm. Most firms, however, are run by managers, whose interests do 
not always coincide with those of the equityholders. Management is often 
thought to be more risk averse than equityholders because more of their 
59. TillS also follows from supra notes 56 and 57. The larger H,. is, the larger are e·. 
and 9"•· 
60. The results are ambiguous as to whether strict liability or a negligence rule that looks 
back to the first sale has a h1gher critical value of p when in Case II. This is because the 
expected values of the equity if production ceases and if production contmues are both higher 
with negligence than with strict liability. Accordingly, because the decision whether to continue 
production is made by comparing the expected value of the equity under the two circumstances, 
neither rule necessarily has a higher or lower critical probab1ltty than the other. 
61.  Stt 1 LOUIS R. FRUMER & MEL YIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1.02 ( 1997) 
(descnbmg the history of products liab1ltry law); LANDES & POSNER, supra note 46, at 284-86 
(identifying strict liab1ltty supplanting negligence as one of the two most important develop· 
ments in the history of products ltab1ltty law and dating that development as beginning roughly 
around 1960). 
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wealth is tied up in the firm. They might also be more committed to 
maintaining production because they will be unemployed if production 
stops.62 The first effect would tend to encourage firms to cease producing 
risky products, whereas the second would have the opposite effect. A more 
thorough understanding of the perverse effect would require taking into 
account the ability of equityholders to control their agents--the managers 
who make these decisions.6J However, scholarly work on the introduction 
of agency theory into tort law is only at the earliest stages.64 
A related complication that has been ignored thus far is the possibility 
of equityholders withdrawing capital from the firm. Such withdrawals are 
attractive to the equityholders because they will generally not have to 
repay these amounts to the corporation's creditors if the product is dan­
gerous and the corporation becomes insolvent. The possibility of such 
withdrawals has an ambiguous effect on the decision whether or not to 
continue production. The possibility of withdrawing funds from the corpo­
ration will increase the value to the equityholders of ceasing production 
because the owners will receive more. Such a possibility will also increase 
the value of continuing, because if the product is dangerous, the 
equityholders will still receive something. If the entire equity could be 
stripped out of the corporation before the victims obtained a judgment, 
production would continue indefinitely. Of course, in this case, stiffening 
tort penalties would have no effect on the decision whether to continue 
production, because no liability awards would ever be paid. If everything 
could be stripped out of the firm only if it ceased production, because of the 
need for working capital or otherwise, then this possibility would encourage 
ceasing production. If, however, the equityholders could strip money out 
from the firm only by continuing production, perhaps because ceasing 
production would lead courts to impose a constructive trust and wait for a 
resolution of the claims, the possibility of withdrawing funds would 
encourage continuing production. Moreover, under these last circum­
stances, higher penalties will encourage continuation. In any event, a 
62. See Mark J. Roe, Corporate Sn-ategic Reaction w Mass Tort, 72 VA. L. REV. I, 10-17 
( 1986) (arguing that managers are likely to maintain production in the face of mass tort risks for 
a variety of reasons, including job security). 
63. Managers also have their reputations, which are tied to the success of their firms. It is 
unclear in which direction this cuts: managers might discourage production to avoid association 
with the harmful product; conversely, managers might encourage production because of the 
higher profits in the short run and possibly over the long run. 
64. Among the few such examples are the articles by Professors Arlen and Roe. Stt Arlen, 
supra note 3 7; Roe, supra note 62. 
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more complete model would consider the possibility of withdrawing funds 
from the corporation and, in the extreme, liquidating the corporation.65 
A related issue, not previously discussed, is the effectiveness of other 
mechanisms in eliminating the perverse effect by restraining the manu­
facturer's ability to externalize risk. Such mechanisms can be divided 
between private and public. 
One private mechanism that might prevent manufacturers from 
selling many potentially dangerous products is the decision by retailers as 
to what products to carry. Under long-standing products liability doctrine, 
the retailer is jointly and severally liable with the manufacturer for any 
harm caused by a product it sells. Thus, for retail goods, it is not sufficient 
for the manufacturer to produce the goods; retailers must also sell them. 
Hence, the perverse effect will not occur when stiffer penalties cause so 
many retailers to drop out of the market that the manufacturer can no 
longer sell enough products for it to be worthwhile to continue production. 
Another private mechanism that might restrain manufacturers from 
producing many potentially dangerous products is the intervention of out­
side investors. Although equityholders might see the decision to continue 
to produce a potentially dangerous product as a good gamble, the firm's 
debtholders, who have a smaller potential gain and a larger potential loss, 
might regard the decision otherwise. The strong incentive equityholders 
have to externalize risk under certain circumstances is well recognized, 
both in the academic literature and in practice.66 To restrain equityholders 
from transferring risk to debtholders, capital structures are designed and 
bond covenants are often inserted into trust indentures.67 Of course, 
assuming such covenants are effective, there is a point at which the gamble 
looks good to the debtholders and so they would not seek to prevent it. 
More generally, the presence of other investors in the firm only changes 
the point at which the perverse effect occurs, not irs existence. 
There are also public mechanisms to restrain manufacturers from 
externalizing risk. Managers who impose outrageous risks on the public 
face the possibility of personal liability and criminal sanctions. In theory, 
at least, these sanctions can prevent managers from pursuing risky projects 
65. Professor Mark Roe argues that a liquidation is an unlikely response to a mass torr. See 
Roe, supra note 62, at 59 (considering strategic responses to mass torrs and concludong that the 
complete avoidance of liabolity IS "untested, unproven, and seems unlikely to be uniformly 
successful"). 
66. See e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theary of w Finn: Managerial 
Be/oa.,or, Agency Costs and Ownership Srrw:ture, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 334--37 ( 1976). 
67. Examples of such covenants onclude requiring bondholder approval of certain deci· 
sions or requiring the firm to purchase insurance or to maintain certain financial ratios. 
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that they a s  stockholders, as well as employees, might want to pursue. That 
mechanism, however, is probably not very effective when the probability 
that the product is injurious is low because, under those circumstances, 
almost any decision can be defended as reasonable. However, when the 
probability that the product is dangerous is very high, sanctions are much 
more likely, and so these mechanisms might be effective. Thus, the 
efficacy of these and perhaps other mechanisms in restraining the perverse 
effect warrants additional attention.68 
Assuming that the perverse effect is widespread, the question arises as 
to what, if anything, should be done about it. One possibility is to reduce 
penalties. If tort penalties are excessive, this Article has provided an 
additional reason for reducing them-increasing penalties might actually 
encourage manufacturers to maintain riskier products on the market, 
whereas reducing penalties might have the opposite effect. Moreover, this 
Article suggests that one cannot infer from an observation that there are 
many dangerous products on the market that tort penalties are too low, 
because stiff penalties might be responsible for the most dangerous 
products. Obviously, reducing penalties might create its own problems. 
For firms in Case I, in which stiffer penalties have the usual deterrent effect 
of causing manufacturers to withdraw less risky products, reducing tort 
penalties will encourage manufacturers to maintain less safe products on 
the market. Moreover, reducing penalties is likely to encourage firms to 
introduce less safe products. 
A second possible response is to establish minimum corporate equity 
requirements. Although the United States has no such general require­
ments, balance sheet regulation is common in several industries, especially 
financial services.69 Although requiring greater equity would reduce the 
perverse effect, such a requirement would impose large costs on manu­
facturers, which would be passed along to consumers. Capital is expensive 
to hire, and doing so on the off chance that it would later be required to 
pay a judgment would impose large and otherwise avoidable costs.70 Thus, 
before concluding that there should be minimum corporate equity require-
68. There are also social pressures and moral obhgauons that might affect the decision 
whether to continue production. 
69. See generally Joseph Jude Norton, Caporal Adequacy Standards: A l.egitJmate Regularory 
Concern for Pl'lUkntial Supervuion of Banking Accil!ltifi?, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1299 ( 1989) (describing 
the history of bank capiral regulation in the United States). 
70. In addouon, some commentators believe that equity is an especially costly form of 
capital because debt is much more effective at disciplining managers. See Michael C. Jensen, 
Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Cort=ate Finance, and Takovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 324--
25 ( 1986). 
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ments, it would be worthwhile to consider eliminating the ex1stmg tax 
incentives that encourage corporations to increase debt and reduce equity. 
The largest of these is the preferential tax treatment of debt relative to • 11 equity. 
Another possible response is to require corporations to obtain liability 
insurance. Requiring manufacturers to carry complete liability insurance 
would not only protect tort creditors, it would also internalize the full cost 
of the harm. Thus, returning once again to the example from Part I, 
assuming 9 = 1, full insurance would cost $1.6 million if the manufacturer 
continued production. Because that amount would exceed the gain from 
additional sales by $600,000, the manufacturer would cease production if it 
were required to purchase full insurance.12 Thus, at least in theory, the 
perverse effect could be eliminated by requiring full insurance. In practice, 
however, there are problems with requiring full insurance, because insur­
ance creates problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Most notably, 
it dampens the incentives for other parties to take precautions that could 
reduce the probability or magnitude of the harm. 
A fourth possible response is to reverse the trend from negligence to 
strict liability in products liability matters. Replacing strict liability with 
negligence would ameliorate the perverse effect of stiffer penalties by 
extending the region in which stiffer penalties have their usual effect. 
However, the debate as to whether strict liability or negligence is the 
appropriate standard in products liability matters involves many issues in 
addition to the perverse effect, and as yet is unresolved.73 Thus, if negli­
gence is the appropriate standard for reasons unrelated to the perverse 
effect, then the amelioration of that effect is a further advantage of 
71 .  �e jANE G. GRAvaLE, CONGRESSIONAL REsEARCH SERVICE, CORPORATE TAX 
INTEGRATION: ISSUES AND OPTIONS I I  ( 1991) (esumating that the total tax rate on debt is 
about half of that on equity). 
72. There is a 10% chance that the widgets are dangerous. If they are dangerous and pro· 
duction continues, the new sales will cause $16 million of harm. Thus, the expected harm, the 
product of the probability that widgets are dangerous (0.1) and the harm if they are dangerous 
($16 million), is $1.6 million. Thus, an insurance company would require the manufacturer to 
pay $1.6 million to provide $16 mtllion m coverage if the widgets are dangerous. Because the 
manufacturer would only make a $1 million profit by continuing production, it would lose 
$600,000 if it continued production and purchased the msurance policy. 
73. Compare William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, A Posiriw Economic Analysis of 
Products LiabtiJty, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 535 (1985) (arguing that the replacement of negligence 
with strict liability in products liability matters enhances efficiency), with George L. Priest, The 
lnwnrion of Enterpnse Uability: A CntJCal Hl.!tury of the lntellwual Foundaaons of Modem Tort 
lAw, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 ( 1 985) (arguing that negligence ts more efftctent than strict liabtltty 
in products liability matters). �e also ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND EcoNOM· 
ICS 438-39 (1988) (summarizing the above debate). 
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returning to a negligence standard. Alternatively, if strict liability is the 
appropriate standard, then the need to find another response to the per­
verse effect remains as strong as ever. 
Still another possible response to the perverse effect is to improve the 
position of tort creditors in bankruptcy by paying their claims before the 
claims of unsecured creditors.74 Although improving the priority of tort 
creditors would increase their likely recoveries in bankruptcy, it would not 
eliminate the perverse effect. This is because equityholders and voluntary 
unsecured creditors together would still have an incentive to externalize 
risk to tort creditors. Once the point is reached at which the unsecured 
investors' investments in the tortfeasor corporation would be wiped out, 
the risk of loss is borne by tort creditors. Under these circumstances, 
neither the equityholders nor the unsecured voluntary creditors have a 
strong incentive to prevent the continued production of a potentially dan· 
gerous product. Thus, improving the position of tort creditors in bank­
ruptcy does not eliminate the perverse effect, it only changes the point at 
which it occurs. 
A sixth possible solution is to rely more heavily on regulations. In 
principle, the entire ability of manufacturers to externalize risk to consum­
ers because of limited liability can be eliminated by direct regulation: 
regulators can remove those products that are "too risky" and that manu­
facturers are unwilling to withdraw from the market. In actuality, regu­
lation is likely to be of only limited efficacy. This is because the regulator 
must have a lot of knowledge to regulate effectively, which is unlikely to be 
true, and because the regulator must be able to make an independent 
decision free of political influences, which is open to question. Thus, 
although the possibility of manufacturers externalizing risk to consumers 
might justify some regulations, it is unlikely that regulation can eliminate 
that possibility. 
A seventh possible response is to eliminate limited corporate liability 
and the discharge of debts in bankruptcy.75 Although academics have made 
proposals along both these lines,76 none of these proposals has met with 
74. �e Leebron, suflra note 15,  at 1643-46 (proposmg that tort creditors be gtven pnonty 
over both secured and unsecured creditors in bankruptcy). 
75. Such reforms would internalize the enure downside risk, thereby eliminating the trun· 
cated downside that equityholders see of risky projects. 
76. See Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorgani�anons, 15 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 127 ( 1 986) (corporate bankruptcy); Douglas G. Batrd, A World Without Bankruptcy, 50 
J.L & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173 (1987) (personal bankruptcy); Henry Hansmann & Reinier 
Kraakman, Toward Unlnruted Shareholder Ltab<Lty for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991) 
(proposing to hold shareholders proportionately liable for claims that exceed corporate assets). 
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much support, and modifying limited liability would also impose costs.77 
Thus, if the problem described in this Article is widespread, as it appears to 
be, there will be a need to craft a response, either from the list above or 
elsewhere, that eliminates or at least reduces the problem, without 
imposing too many other costs. 
CONCLUSION 
The economic approach to tort law is based on the premise that 
individuals respond to incentives.78 The most basic result in that literature 
is that stiffer penalties discourage less risky activities.79 Previous commen­
tators have shown that larger penalties have no additional deterrent effect 
once a tortfeasor's wealth is exhausted.l!O This Article has shown that for 
the important example of products liability cases, the deterrent effect of 
stiffer penalties does not merely disappear, but is actually reversed once a 
tortfeasor's wealth is exhausted. Stiffer penalties then encourage tortfeasors 
to keep riskier products on the market that they would have withdrawn 
with less stiff penalties. The explanation for this perverse result is that the 
manufacturers' decision whether to continue production depends on a 
comparison of its expected equity from continuing and ceasing production. 
Initially, raising penalties reduces the expected value of the equity from 
both continuing and discontinuing production. But, once penalties have 
been raised to the level at which the manufacturer would be bankrupt if 
the product is dangerous and production continues, further raising pen­
alties only reduces the expected value of the equity from discontinuing 
production. Thus, in products liability matters, the usual logic-that 
higher awards and tougher rules (strict liability over negligence) will dis­
courage the production of risky products-is at some point reversed. 
Moreover, the perverse effect is likely to be widespread, even at low penalty 
levels, especially for firms that do not have a diversified product line and 
whose products have the potential to cause great harm. It is therefore 
possible that reducing tort penalties in products liability cases will 
77. &t FRANK H. EAsTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 49-52 (1991) (de.«:ribing the costs of unhmited liability). 
78. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 73, at I I  (stating that "the rules created by law 
establish implicit prices for different kinds of behavior, and the consequences of those rules can 
be analyzed as the response to those implicit prices") (emphasis omitted); LANDES & POSNER, 
supra note 46, at 9-14 (defending the assumption). 
79. This is a simple application of the law of demand-raise the price and less will be 
purchased. 
80. &t generall-y Polmsky & Shavell, supra note 2; Shavell, supra note 2. 
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encourage manufacturers to withdraw their riskiest products from the 
market. If that is true, the concerns of proponents and opponents of 
products liability reform, encouraging the introduction of new products and 
removing dangerous products from the market, can both be met by 
reducing the stiffness of tort penalties. 
